Posts Tagged ‘Bond’
Bank of Japan Policy Meeting Preview – Chance Of A Bond Crash?

Excerpted via Bill Blain of Mint Partners,

The current Bank of Japan policy meeting is possibly the most important thing going on this week (even more so than Bernanke’s comments perhaps). If, as is distinctly possible, they don’t do anything to reinforce the immediacy of the Kuroda QQE package, we could be looking at bond markets reacting in a most “unfavorable manner”.  The effect would be to reinforce the latest round of ‘fear-on’ bond selling – certainly over the short-term, and the damaged sentiment could impact stocks also.

(Read more…)

That’s why the Bank of Japan policy meeting today/tomorrow will be so interesting. Can it nurture and sustain real growth? Devaluing yen to benefit exporters does seem to be working – look at recent Yen corporate results. However, now we’ve got the rest of Asia looking to balance Japan’s competitive devaluation. We still need to see how the other side of Abe-onomics works: rebuilding Japan. How vulnerable is the BoJ game? The Nikkei may be massively higher, but interest rates and JGB’s remain stubbornly volatile and high – a factor conflating the global bond worries… if the Fed is going to end QE and Japan’s QE squared isn’t working, then bond players will quite rightly capitulate.

There is probably not much the BoJ can say at this meeting – it’s got to give the policy (of massive QE) time to work. That leaves markets highly vulnerable to a sense of disappointment tomorrow. On the other hand, we’ve long said.. “Don’t fight Kuroda!”

Whatever happens in the Japan story; how much longer the Fed keeps up the buying, and the implications on Global QE remain the main themes and drivers of the current market. The question is, for how long might markets be put on the back foot by the continued weakness in JGB and knock on effects. [let alone Europe]

Back in the bond market, over the last few days the search for yield does seem capped. There have been some stumbles in new issues, and we’re encountering reluctance from buyers to engage some excellent client offers for the highest yielding names like Greece or Slovenia. We’ve seen limited interest in relative spread trades – for instance privately placed Canada risk at a significant spread over the underlying provincial names. That all tells me the bond market is nervous.

    



 
“The Approximate Present Does Not Approximately Determine The Future”

Chaos Theory turns 50 years old this year, celebrating half a century of flapping butterfly wings in Brazil creating tornadoes in Texas.  That most famous example is especially appropriate, since it was a meteorologist named Edward Lorenz who first outlined why seemingly consistent and knowable systems can still go wildly wrong.  As it turns out, as ConvergEx’s Nick Colas reminds us, small errors in measurement or observation at the start of a time series can significantly change how things look at the end.  In the current low volatility, one-variable central bank driven global equity markets, Chaos Theory may seem a quaint relic of past crises.  However, its central lesson – that complex interrelated systems create unexpected outcomes from seemingly benign inputs – is still relevant. (Read more…)  Students of economics like to think of their discipline as scientific, just like physics or other hard sciences.  They would do well to embrace the intellectual honesty neatly encapsulated by the central lessons of Chaos Theory.

 

Via ConvergEx’s Nick Colas:

If I asked you to name a famous weatherman, I doubt you’d come up with Dr. Edward Lorenz of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  No, he’s no Al Roker or Jim Cantore in terms of fame or fortune.  He never stood in the middle of a hurricane to report for the Weather Channel or walked through a devastated trailer park after a tornado.

Dr. Lorenz’s contributions, however, have a far wider reach because he is the researcher who came up with what we know today as ‘Chaos Theory’.  Here’s brief history of the man and his discovery:

  • Edward Lorenz was born in West Hartford Connecticut in 1917, attending Dartmouth (BA 1935) and Harvard (Master’s 1940).  He served as a meteorologist for the U.S. Army Air Corp. during World War II and earned two degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology during and after the war.
  • At the time, weather forecasting was considered pretty simple stuff.  Take enough inputs from today’s climate and you should be able to forecast tomorrow’s weather pretty closely.  Simple, but not especially effective.  And potentially deadly for an air force during times of war, even the “Cold” one which followed the armistices of 1945.
  • Lorenz thought that the linear approach was wrong, and started working on non-linear algorithms to forecast the weather from his new seat as a MIT professor.  In the mid 1950s, he started to use an early computer – the Royal McBee LGP-30 – to help with the calculations.  Its clock speed was 120 kHz, about 100,000 slower than an iPhone 5.  It weighed 740 pounds.  But it was better than doing thousands of calculations by hand.
  • To speed up the calculations of the many iterations required for his research, Lorenz truncated the number of decimal places for the inputs to his model.  He then went back and added more detail to those same inputs – 2.212 became 2.212175 – to see if he got a more fine-tuned response.  To his surprise, those little tweaks created very different outcomes in his models.  Small changes to the “Base state” – today’s weather conditions, for example – could result in radically different expectations for the weather in just a few days time.
  • Lorenz published a paper on this phenomenon in 1963 – 50 years ago – titled “Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow.”  Yeah, not a very catchy name…  And according to a summary about the 50th anniversary of the paper in Physics Today, it garnered fewer than 20 citations in the dozen years after its publication. 
  • Lorenz’s observations begin to catch real traction only in the mid-1970s, when a paper titled “Period Three Implies Chaos” (Li and Yorke, 1975) gave his ideas a catchy name and a new audience: mathematicians and physicists.

In 1972, Lorenz gave a talk which he titled “Predictability: Does the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas?”  This famous observation is almost as well-known as the term “Chaos Theory” itself, and serves to explain the basics of Lorenz’s discovery.  Three quick points here:

  • Lorenz’s 1962 paper summarized his findings this way: “For those systems with bounded solutions, it is found that nonperiodic solutions are ordinarily unstable with respect to small modifications, so that slightly different initial states can evolve into considerably different states.”
  • He later summarize “Chaos” more concisely as “When the present determines the future, but the approximate present does not approximately determine the future. 
  • In totally laymen’s language, Chaos Theory says that if you want to forecast the future you need to know everything about the present.  And by “Everything” we mean all knowable characteristics of today, in infinite detail.  Even if you have a great set of formulas in a comprehensive model about how those many variables interrelate, your predictions will run afoul of ‘Chaos’ – the ability of an overlooked (and typically small) characteristic of the starting point to have a large effect on the outcome.

 

In the world of economics and capital markets, Chaos Theory clearly resonates.  The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 and its follow-on travails all have the gentle flutter of the butterfly’s wings somewhere at their core.  Small issues – a marginal residential development in Scottsdale, a deal by Greek monks for some Athenian commercial real estate – quickly cascade to become the tornado in Texas.   Or New York, or London, for that matter.

What I find most striking is the current market psychology that seems to think all the butterflies are dead, or at least safely in their pupae.  Observed volatility for stock prices, as measured by the S&P 500 Index, are trending lower over the last 10 and 20 days, even as the market itself reaches new highs.  Implied volatility in options contracts are trending lower as well.

It not just the math of volatility that I find most puzzling, but the notion that central bank policy is all that matters to economic and market outcomes.  I get the fact that the last few years have been humbling for everyone from risk-averse investors (who missed the move in risk assets) to policymakers who shovel liquidity into an economic system which still struggles to create jobs or growth.  But it seems very much like commentators and market participants desperately want to believe the world behaves according to simply rules.  “Just buy the equity market whose central bank has the largest bond buying program” is essentially the only piece of investment wisdom needed for the last 48 months.  And counting…

I keep coming back to Lorenz’s statement that “The approximate present does not approximately determine the future.”  We know our approximate present very well, at least in the U.S.:

  • A slow growth economy
  • An accommodative central bank
  • Only one other large economy (Japan) with the appetite to follow our lead in buying large quantities of long dated bonds
  • A seemingly “Self sustaining” rally in stocks, where there is enough momentum to pull at least a few new buyers into the mix.  And low enough interest rates to provide few alternatives to investors.

At the same time, Chaos Theory is clear: this does not approximately determine the future.  There are more than enough variables out there – the butterflies flapping away – which can change outcomes.   Don’t get me wrong – this is not meant to be a doom and gloom closing thought.   If stock markets exhibited ‘normal’ volatility, it would be far easier to defend current price levels.  You could leave the butterfly net at home.  The problem is that current market price action –that slow steady grind higher – indicates marginal buyers don’t fret very much about the future.  No matter how little we really know about it.

 

Additional Reading

Original 1963 paper: http://eaps4.mit.edu/research/Lorenz/Deterministic_63.pdf

50th Anniversary in Physics Today: http://www.physicstoday.org/resource/1/phtoad/v66/i5/p27_s1?bypassSSO=1

    



 
Bernanke KIKs the Can

 

In February, when Ben Bernanke gave his report to Congress, he spoke of his concern about "Excessive risk taking". On May 10 he repeated his warning:

 

very low interest rates, if maintained for a considerable time, could impair financial stability. (Read more…) For example, portfolio managers dissatisfied with low returns may “reach for yield” by taking on more credit risk, duration risk, or leverage.

 

So what is Ben talking about? What does it mean when he says "reach for yield"? I think I may have found a good example of what Ben is referring to. Consider this bank financing that was completed last week:

 

Borrower: KIK Custom Products

Amounts:

1st lien = $420Mn – Priced at LIBOR plus 425bp – priced at 99.

2nd lien = $220Mn – Priced at LIBOR plus 825bp – priced at 98.

Floor pricing = Minimum LIBOR was set at 1.25% (100bp over current LIBOR rate)

Company rating = Caa/B-

Fees = Undisclosed – must have been big – 3+%

Book runner = UBS

 

KIK Custom Products makes bleach and soap. The company is owned by CI Capital Partners, a NYC based LBO outfit. There is no publicly available financial information for KIK, but the pricing/rating and the sponsor tell me that this is a highly leveraged deal. What kills me is that this is a recap deal. This financing replaces the existing debt of KIK, and therefore it is on substantially better terms than what existed before the recap.

This is a junk deal. It's not suitable for widow and orphans – but that's where this paper is going to end up. This loan will work its way into the many Loan Mutual Funds that are available to retail investors. Small investors have been pouring money into bank loan funds. Every month for the past four-years money has flown into this investment class. So far this year $20Bn has found its way to junk bank loan funds. Another $900Mn came in last week.

As an ex junk guy, I have no problems with the KIK deal – provided that this dodgy paper ends up in the hands of true 'Sophisticated Investors'. But I do have a problem with the fact that this deal could not have happened were it not for Ben Bernanke and his unending squeeze on returns for small investors.

The second lien tranche of the KIK deal has a return north of 10%. The only exit strategy for this paper is another re-cap; cash flow from operations at KIK will not pay this loan down. So this is a one-way-out deal. I think deals like this must have Bernanke looking over his shoulder. He must know that this is the perfect description of investors "reaching for yield".

Some will look at the KIK deal and conclude that this is evidence of a healthy capital market. I see it it quite the opposite. This type of financing is an accident waiting to happen. The fact is that Bernanke's money policies have long since crossed over from being something that contributes to economic health and stability, to something that is adding to systemic risks and instability. I suspect that Bernanke is well aware of this fact, so are other members at the FRB. If you're looking for evidence that Bernanke has pushed the string too far, the KIK deal is all you need to look at.

If Bernanke is honest with the facts, he would wind down QE as fast as he could. If he doesn't, then his warnings over the past few months about the risks of cheap money are just a lie. So Ben has a hard choice in front of him. Either he backs off of his reckless money policy, or his legacy goes up in smoke. The bubbles are popping up all over in 2013, I don't think that Ben wants to go down in the history books as another Fed Chairman that creates bubbles that come crashing down.

I think there is a high probability that the Fed lowers the amount of QE purchases in June. That's just a few days away. The gold and bond markets have been "saying" that QE is ending for the past few months. The equity and junk markets have largely ignored the signs. June is setting up as an interesting month.

 

Oshit