Posts Tagged ‘New York Fed’
“Hawks, Doves, Owls And Seagulls” – Summarizing The Fed’s Bird Nest

With part two of today’s Fed-a-palooza due out shortly in the form of the May 1 FOMC meeting minutes, here is an informative recap of the current roster of assorted birds at the FOMC via Bank of America. Of course, since every decision always begins and ends with Ben, and soon his replacement Janet, all of below is largely meaningless.

Hawks, doves, owls and seagulls

Speeches by FOMC participants often get a fair bit of attention, and that has been particularly true of late. (Read more…) The markets are very sensitive to any hint that the Fed might scale back QE3 soon. Unfortunately, given the diversity of views on the FOMC, it is not always easy to separate the signal from the noise when Fed officials speak. The best advice is to listen to the voters (Table 1), especially the core members: Chairman Ben Bernanke, Vice Chair Janet Yellen and New York Fed President Bill Dudley (and vice chair of the FOMC).

While FOMC participants are typically split along a hawk/dove spectrum, in the current group there are several Fed officials with more nuanced views. For example, there are some arguably hawkish (or formerly hawkish) participants who nonetheless favor additional accommodation. Conversely, there are those who are typically thought of as doves yet who advocate scaling back QE more quickly. These conflicting cross-currents only add to the market’s confusion.

To understand most Fed officials’ policy preferences, it helps to step back and consider their philosophical bases — which for many goes back to their training in economics. Specifically, many of the divisions on the FOMC reflect differences between “freshwater” and “saltwater” schools of thought in economics — so named for the location of the US graduate schools (inland versus the coasts) where each has been most prevalent. In brief, freshwater economists emphasize market efficiency, rational expectations and policy ineffectiveness, while saltwater economists see market failures, multiple equilibria and a role for countercyclical
demand management.

Oceans apart

Some key differences between these two schools of thought as they relate to monetary policy are listed below:

  • Monetarists versus New Keynesians: The basic modeling framework for freshwater economists is often monetarist, where the key responsibility of a central bank is long-run price stability. Saltwater economists use a New Keynesian framework that suggests policy can help stabilize markets.
  • Inflation vs. unemployment: Freshwater economists see inflation as having a clear priority in the Fed’s dual mandate, and are skeptical that unemployment (or slack more generally) has much to do with inflation. Saltwater economists see reducing unemployment as its own objective in the short-run. Both sides agree that a central bank should credibly commit to a long-run nominal anchor, like an inflation target.
  • Structural vs. cyclical labor market factors: Freshwater economists tend to see a significant portion of current unemployment as structural; equivalently, they see underlying equilibrium unemployment rate as relatively high right now — and not amenable to monetary policy stimulus. Saltwater economists believe that the labor market suffers mostly from cyclically weak labor demand. Some have suggested that policy needs to be very easy to prevent persistent cyclical unemployment from becoming structural. They forecast the NAIRU (the unemployment rate consistent with steady inflation) to be relatively low (perhaps 5%); saltwater types think it is higher.
  • Transmission mechanisms. Monetarist channels of greater liquidity and credit creation are key for freshwater views; these are seen as currently ineffective in promoting growth but a risk for higher inflation. The New Keynesian view associated with a saltwater approach emphasizes low interest rates stimulating demand and higher asset values allowing for balance sheet repair and creating a wealth effect.
  • Inflation expectation risks: Freshwater adherents see inflation as determined by the pace of money printing and policy credibility; they worry that large central bank balance sheets risk rising inflation expectations. Saltwater economists counter that persistent low inflation and large output gaps risk inflation expectations deteriorating below long-run inflation targets.
  • Costs vs. benefits of QE: Freshwater economists are skeptical of any benefits from QE for real activity, and worry about the potential costs in terms of inflation and financial instability. Saltwater economists see unconventional policy as simply an extension of easing when at the zero lower bound; the way it should work is similar to “normal times.” Both sides are uncertain of the efficacy of continued QE, but saltwater economists tend to be more optimistic of its effectiveness.

From theory to practice

Freshwater programs are associated with universities such as Chicago, Minnesota and Rochester. Saltwater views are more common at institutions such as MIT, Princeton and Yale on the East Coast, and Berkeley on the West. A similar pattern is found at the regional Federal Reserve Banks: those on the coasts tend to  have saltwater orientations, while those inland skew more toward freshwater views. But in both cases, there are interesting exceptions that we discuss below.

For most FOMC participants, the freshwater/saltwater divide mirrors the hawk/dove categorization — Chart 1 plots a fairly standard spectrum for the current FOMC participants. Thus, for example, the steady hawks have strong freshwater connections. The research records of Philadelphia’s Charles Plosser and Richmond’s Jeffrey Lacker belie the East Coast locations of their Banks. While Dallas’s Richard Fisher and Kansas City’s Esther George are not trained as economists, they hail from solidly freshwater Banks. The backgrounds and affiliations of each FOMC participant are listed in Table 2.

 

These four members have cast the majority of dissents in recent years (in addition to George’s predecessor at Kansas City, Thomas Hoenig, who also was a serial dissenter). They have been critical of QE since its first round, and have lately called for its early end, arguing the costs exceed the benefits. Of this group, only George is a voter this year, and we expect her to dissent at least until the Fed starts to taper QE3. As Chart 2 shows, a core group of hawks have been a persistent source of dissents during Bernanke’s time as chairman — nearly 60% of FOMC meetings have not been unanimous since he took the helm in 2006.

At the other end is the more dovish majority. This group includes Chairman Ben Bernanke, Vice Chair Janet Yellen, and New York Fed President Bill Dudley, as well as Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren. All are voting members this year. We expect the other Board members who are not trained as economists — Sarah Bloom Raskin, Elizabeth Duke, Jerome Powell and Daniel Tarullo — to vote with the majority, as all have indicated support for the current policy stance within the past few months. And while some in the market have speculated that Governor Jeremy Stein has a hawkish streak after his 7 February speech on “Overheating in Credit Markets,” we note that he characterized his discussion as “an extended hypothetical” and concluded that any potential losses are “confined” and a “relatively limited” source of systemic risk.

Neither fish nor fowl

Other Fed officials do not fit into this hawk/dove categorization quite so neatly. Atlanta’s Dennis Lockhart and Cleveland’s Sandra Pianalto are typically centrists who vote with the majority; lately Lockhart has been generally supportive of the current QE plan, while Pianalto has raised some concerns. Neither is a voting member this year, but Pianalto will be a voter in 2014.

The “owls”

Three Midwestern Fed bank presidents are less hawkish than their counterparts at Dallas or Kansas City, despite their freshwater training: Chicago’s Charles Evans, Minneapolis’s Narayana Kocherlakota, and St. Louis’s James Bullard. Both Evans and Bullard are voters this year, while Kocherlakota votes in 2014.

We consider them the “owls” in our classification, given their tendency to make model-based arguments around policy — and to have taken more dovish policy positions recently. All three have given their support to QE3 purchases, for example, and Evans and Kocherlakota both have enthusiastically promoted the use of  economic thresholds for forward guidance.

St. Louis’s James Bullard

Bullard is arguably the most traditionally hawkish of the owls, describing himself as the “north pole of inflation hawks” — despite regularly drawing on New Keynesian models in his research. He also has been the most vocal advocate of making small changes to the purchase pace for QE. In his most recent speech on 21 April, he said that QE “remains the best monetary policy option” in the current situation and recommended continuing at the current pace.

Note that Bullard is regarded as having been early in calling for QE2, although he also has been an opponent of forward guidance — so his track record as a barometer of where the rest of the FOMC may go has been mixed. Bullard has argued for beginning to taper QE3 as the unemployment rate gets close to 7% and  growth rises to around 3 ¼%. While he has seen these outcomes as possible by the end of this year, the March projections by the FOMC suggest most of his colleagues don’t expect to hit those criteria until later next year.

Minneapolis’s Narayana Kocherlakota

Kockerlakota has a relatively short history on the FOMC — he became President of the Minneapolis Fed in October 2009 and first voted in 2011 — but it has been
a colorful one. In 2011 he twice joined Fisher and Plosser in hawkish dissents: against introducing a calendar date for forward guidance in August, then against additional accommodation in the form of Operation Twist in September. However, in September 2012, Kocherlakota had a road-to-Damascus conversion. He completely changed his song, and called for the Fed to adopt a “liftoff plan”: keep rates low until the unemployment rate hits 5.5% — provided that inflation was no more than 25 basis points above target. Since then, he has said that more stimulus would be “desirable.”

In our view, Kocherlakota is the owl most likely to change his feathers and become more hawkish again. However, we would not expect that to happen while inflation is running (well) below the Fed’s long-run 2% objective. If the outlook for PCE inflation one- to two-years ahead were running above 2.25% or so, we would then expect him to revert to a hawkish stance. But as of now, that looks rather unlikely for next year, when he is once again a voter.

Chicago’s Charles Evans

Evans has been the most avidly and consistently dovish of the owls, supporting aggressive Fed easing as a voter in 2009 and 2011 — and dissenting twice, in November and December 2011, in favor of additional policy accommodation. In late 2011, Evans developed and refined what would ultimately become the threshold approach to forward guidance that the FOMC as a whole adopted in December 2012. Evans’s advocacy for this approach was cited by Kocherlakota as a strong influence over Kocherlakota’s own thinking.

Evans is a voter again this year. In his most recent public remarks on 20 May, he sounded more optimistic about the outlook for growth and employment, although he said he would like to see at least a few more months of data before thinking about tapering. Evans also repeated his condition of several months of greater than 200,000 in monthly payroll growth as a marker for a “substantial” improvement in the labor market. He observed that the Fed is missing on both its employment and inflation objectives, and said the Fed needed more time to assess the effects of policy. He also noted that it was important that policy makers did not become complacent given the still powerful headwinds facing the economy. On net, we interpret Evans’s remarks as suggesting the earliest he would support tapering would be early fall, and mid-year slowdown would reset the clock.

The “seagulls”

Whereas the owls are dovish-sounding FOMC participants who have hawkish (freshwater) backgrounds or inclinations, the “seagulls” are saltwater doves who have flown far from shore and are starting to sound more hawkish. While some might put Stein or the latest remarks by Evans in this category, we currently see one main member of this group: San Francisco Fed President John Williams.

San Francisco’s John Williams

Before becoming the president of the San Francisco Fed, Williams worked as a staff economist at the Board of Governors in Washington DC and at the San Francisco Bank. Much of his research has been in a New Keynesian framework. And he has been relatively dovish in his speeches since becoming president in 2011. Lately, however, he has been talking about a possible early end to QE3.

In his most recent speech on 16 May, Williams discussed the progress made since QE3 began, noting that the labor market has “improved considerably” but not yet “substantial improvement” — that will take “further gains.” However, he went on to say that “assuming my economic forecast holds true” and “appreciable improvement” occurs in “various labor market indicators” in “coming months,” then the Fed “could reduce somewhat” the purchase pace “perhaps as early as this summer.” “If all goes as hoped,” the Fed could then conclude QE3 “sometime late this year,” according to Williams.

There are a lot of conditionals in those statements, and they require a lot of things to go right. In effect, Williams has outlined more of a “best case” than a “base case” for tapering and ultimately concluding QE3. He has had a similarly optimistic outlook for the past few months, while acknowledging many of the downside risks that have kept his more dovish colleagues cautious and less willing to advocate for a quick end to QE3. That, in our view, makes his current views less representative of the FOMC majority. Given the markets typically view the San Francisco Fed as particularly dovish, he also may be trying to create a more balanced impression and avoid being labeled an über-dove. Most importantly, however, he is not a voter again until 2015.

Birds of a feather

A number of current FOMC participants do not fit so easily into a simple hawk/dove division. While it is still possible to broadly characterize the 19 Fed officials at the FOMC meetings along such a spectrum (as we have done in Chart 1), that can increase the risk that the views of certain members are misconstrued as giving greater insight into the likely policy choices of the Committee than is warranted. As we noted at the outset, most attention should be given to the core of the Committee: Chairman Bernanke, Vice Chair Yellen and New York Fed President Dudley. In addition, it pays to focus mostly on the FOMC voting members — and the current group skews dovish, in our view. Fade the hawks, but also be cautious about interpreting the owls and seagulls — they sometimes fly far from the majority.

    



 
Hilsenrath Hits The Tape: Ignore Everything I Said Two Weeks Ago

The last time the WSJ’ Jon Hilsenrath was relevant was two weeks ago (in a flashback to those days before QEternity when infinite QE was not assured and Jon’s input was actually relevant), when following an article of his, and due to his “proximity” with the New York Fed, many assumed that the Tapering suggested by Hilsenrath was being telegraphed by Bernanke to the market. Turns out it was nothing but yet another baffle with bullshit headfake by a central planning regime that is now merely engaged in observing market responses to indirect stimuli: if reduce monthly flow by $20 billion then X (-1%); if cut QE off entirely then Y (-50%?), and so on. Moments ago the same Hilsenrath just released another piece, which effectively refuted everything his previous piece suggested, and in fact made his (Read more…) as Fed mouthpiece absolutely irrelevant, courtesy of the following disclosure: “this time, when the Fed shuts off bond buying, it won’t be… predictable.” He goes so far as to say that the term “tapering” is no longer even applicable! Funny that, considering on May 11, none other than Hilsenrath said: “Federal Reserve officials have mapped out a strategy for winding down an unprecedented $85 billion-a-month bond-buying program meant to spur the economy.”

The irony here is that Hilsenrath is correct, but for another far simpler reason: the Fed simply can not shut down bond buying, at least not voluntarily, without crashing bond the stock market, and the perception that the economy is doing well (it isn’t), just because the S&P hits new all time highs day after day.

The Fed will of course “shut down” bond buying when like in the summer of 2008 simple inflation is raging in commodities, and when a bank has to be sacrificed to induce a deflationary vortex. However, for now thanks to the epic planning in keeping the Brent vigilantes largely in check (now that the Bond vigilatnes are long dead), and since the market has a few more thousand points higher to go before everyone has no choice but to acknowledge how ridiculous the asset bubble has become, there is, to paraphrase Tim Geithner, “no risk.”

From the WSJ:

When the Fed ended a buying program in 2011, it shut it off all at once. When it shut off another bond buying program in 2009 and 2010, it did it in predetermined, predictable and “tapered” steps. When the Fed raised short-term interest rates from 2003 to 2006, it raised them in gradual and very predictable steps.

 

This time, when the Fed shuts off bond buying, it won’t be abrupt and it won’t be predictable. The term “tapering” — which implies a predictable gradual process — probably doesn’t describe the plan very well any more, and you’re unlikely to hear Fed officials describing it like that. Instead, the Fed will take a step and then see what happens. Officials also want to avoid the market blowup that happened in 1994, when it took one step and the market assumed that meant a succession of additional steps.

 

A step to reduce the flow of purchases would not be an automatic, mechanistic process to end the program,” Mr. Bernanke said. In other words, if the Fed takes a step to reduce the program and the economy falters, it could sit still for a while or even dial purchases back up.

 

The Fed effectively wants the markets to experience the same uncertainty it experiences about policy and the economy when officials walk into a meeting, and it wants to condition the market to avoid jumping to conclusions about what it will do next. As officials keep saying, it will depend on the economy.

Perhaps the biggest insult here to sentient creatures everywhere, is that people have now become merely lab rats in the greatest behavioral conditioning experiment of all time, not only as regards to buying stocks on both bad and good news, or any utterance out of Bernanke’s mouth, but an experiment designed to force everyone to simply stop thinking logically – the logic being that since every central bank is engaged full bore in reflating everything, than the economy left on its own is simply horrendous – and BTFD.

    



 
David Rosenberg: “When They Say Unemployment Rate, They Mean The S&P 500″

Last week’s plunge in wholesale sales (and “completely involuntary” surge in inventories) has Gluskin Sheff’s David Rosenberg greatly concerned that current quarter real GDP will be very close to stall speed. However, as he notes, “either Mr. Market has yet to figure this out or simply doesn’t care any more because of the well ingrained belief that the ‘Fed has my back’.” When even the Fed is pimping stocks as cheap, he explains, you know what is dominating the thought process of the central bank’s targeting – “they say unemployment rate, but they really mean the S&P 500.” The ‘wealth effect’, however, only benefits a chosen few and as Rosie illustrates, an historically low 52% of American households have any money invested in the stock market (based on a recent Gallup poll) – which (Read more…) spurs the ‘bulls’ to argue that the Fed has to be more aggressive…

 

Via Gluskin Sheff’s David Rosenberg,

What a shocker! U.S. wholesale trade — which, by the way, is as big as the retail sector – plunged 1.6% in March and is down now in three of the past four months. The consensus was looking for +04%, So this comes as a big surprise and not only that, but February was marked down to a 1.5% gain from 1.7% initially. This not only suggests that we could see a downward revision to first- quarter growth but the momentum into Q2 is very tepid, as is the case for a variety of indicators. The declines were fairly broad-based to boot with computers (-0.9%), metals (-2.5%), machinery (-1.5%), paper (-2.9%) and chemicals (-1.8%) all down sizably.

 

At the same time, wholesale inventories rose 0.4%, taking the inventories-to-sales ratio back up to 1.21 from 1.19, and more disturbingly, the ratio for the cyclically sensitive durable goods sector rose to 1.61 from 1.59, which is the highest since October 2009.

 

From a going forward point of view, the fact that the inventory buildup looks to be completely involuntary is not good news for the production schedules in coming months. It could well be that current quarter real GDP growth is going to be very close to stall-speed of 1% at an annual rate, and either Mr. Market has yet to figure this out or simply doesn’t care any more because of this well ingrained belief that the “Fed has my back”. After all, when the New York Fed publishes a report entitle Are Stocks Cheap? A Review of the Evidence – a study one would think would come from a Wall Street investment bank – you know what is dominating the thought process at the central bank. They say the unemployment rate, but they really mean the S&P 500.

 

After all, to get the wealth effect to work on spending, you have to generate the wealth. And that is what the Fed is trying to do… use the equity market (real estate too) as a means to generate economic activity and a sustainable improvement in the stock market. The distortions cause by negative real interest rates, the mis-pricing of risk and promotion of leverage sounds a lot like the previous cycle, and as I told folks back in 2005 and 2006 when it was reflating commercial bank balance sheets as opposed to today’s primary influence which is the reflating central bank balance sheets, enjoy it while you can.

 


 

Interestingly, the folks at Gallup just updated their survey and found that only 52% of American households now have money invested in the stock market, down from 53% a year ago and 62% five years ago. This is historically quite low… and guess what? This is causing bulls to come out and argue that the Fed has to be even more aggressive and for longer because this reduced public participation in equities means that we need an even larger wealth effect for the half of the population that are not involved in the market in order for the Fed to ultimately get its desired ‘escape velocity’ for the real economy…