Posts Tagged ‘Trading Strategies’
Will JPMorgan’s “Enron” Be The End Of Blythe Masters?

One year after the infamous Jamie Dimon “tempest in a teapot” fiasco, which promptly turned out to be the biggest TBTF prop-trading desk debacle in history, things were going well for JPMorgan.

On one hand, the chairman of the TBAC (and thus US Treasury advisor and policy administrator), and former LTCM trader, Matt Zames, was just recently promoted to the sole second in command post at the biggest US bank (and 2nd biggest in the world) by assets, and first in line to take over from Jamie Dimon. On the other hand, one of Mary Jo White’s former co-workers, and a JPM defense attorney from Debevoise just became head of the SEC’s enforcement division, in theory guaranteeing that the US government would never do more than slap the wrist of JPM in perpetuity.

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And then, when everything seemed like smooth sailing ahead, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) showed up on March 13, the day before Carl Levin’s committee released its latest report on JPM’s prop trading blunder, and according to the NYT, alleged that JPM in the past several years, quietly became nothing short than the next Enron.

Government investigators have found that JPMorgan Chase devised “manipulative schemes” that transformed “money-losing power plants into powerful profit centers,” and that one of its most senior executives gave “false and misleading statements” under oath. The findings appear in a confidential government document, reviewed by The New York Times, that was sent to the bank in March, warning of a potential crackdown by the regulator of the nation’s energy markets.

Another “tempest in a teapot”… Or is JPM reprising the role of the most hated company from the early 2000s, Enron, now that absolutely everyone’s attention is focused on its purportedly criminal activity, potentially a problematic development? It very well might be.

The JPMorgan case arose, according to the document, after the bank’s 2008 takeover of Bear Stearns gave the bank the rights to sell electricity from power plants in California and Michigan. It was a losing business that relied on “inefficient” and outdated technology, or as JPMorgan called it, “an unprofitable asset.”

Funny: another “case” that has arisen, so far at mostly in the tinfoil hat periphery of the blogosphere is that JPM also inherited some massive precious metal shorts when it was handed over Bears Stearns on a Fed-subsidized silver platter, and it is the legacy of these short positions that has encouraged various JPM employees, such as Blythe Masters for example, to not only do everything in their power to push the price of gold and silver lower, but to align directly with the Fed, which wants nothing more than to destroy every single last believer in real, not paper-based, “quality-collateral.”

For now, however, let’s get back to what was previously conspiracy theory, and is now fact:

Under “pressure to generate large profits,” the agency’s investigators said, traders in Houston devised a workaround. Adopting eight different “schemes” between September 2010 and June 2011, the traders offered the energy at prices “calculated to falsely appear attractive” to state energy authorities. The effort prompted authorities in California and Michigan to dole out about $83 million in “excessive” payments to JPMorgan, the investigators said. The behavior had “harmful effects” on the markets, according to the document.

Uh-oh. Sounds suspiciously close to what a certain Houston firm, once upon a time called Enron (advised by none other than one Paul Krugman) was doing to the California electricity market. And where the FERC and legacy ENRON instances arise, sparks are sure to fly.

But what is worst for JPM, and its brilliant (abovementioned) employee, often times credited with creating the Credit Default Swap product and market (simply an instrument to trade credit with negligible upfront collateral and thus allow equity option-like speculation in the credit realm), is that FERC may be seeking to throw the book at none other than Blythe Masters.

In the energy market investigation, the enforcement staff of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC, intends to recommend that the agency pursue an action against JPMorgan over its trading in California and Michigan electric markets. 

 

The 70-page document also took aim at a top bank executive, Blythe Masters.

Blythe did a bad, bad thing. So bad she lied about it under oath 

The regulatory document cites her supposed “knowledge and approval of schemes” carried out by a group of energy traders in Houston. The agency’s investigators claimed that Ms. Masters had “falsely” denied under oath her awareness of the problems and said that JPMorgan had made “scores of false and misleading statements and material omissions” to authorities, the document shows.

Oops. And it’s only downhill from here, because what follows, are the two scariest words a banker can hear in the context of a potential enforcement decision: “individually liable

For now, according to the document, the enforcement officials plan to recommend that the commission hold the traders and Ms. Masters “individually liable.” While Ms. Masters was “less involved in the day-to-day decisions,” investigators nonetheless noted that she received PowerPoint presentations and e-mails outlining the energy trading strategies.

And some more scary words: “systematic cover-up

The bank, investigators said, then “planned and executed a systematic cover-up” of documents that exposed the strategy, including profit and loss statements.

 

In the March document, the government investigators also complained about what they said was obstruction by Ms. Masters. After the state authorities began to object to the strategy, Ms. Masters “personally participated in JPMorgan’s efforts to block” the state authorities “from understanding the reasons behind JPMorgan’s bidding schemes,” the document said.

 

The investigators also referenced an April 2011 e-mail in which Ms. Masters ordered a “rewrite” of an internal document that raised questions about whether the bank had run afoul of the law. The new wording stated that “JPMorgan does not believe that it violated FERC’s policies.”

Looks like the FERC disagreed. But how could it? It was only a year ago that Blythe was on CNBC promising that not only she, but JPMorgan would and could never do anything wrong in the commodities, or any other, arena. Who can possibly forget her unforgettable platitude: “What is commonly out there is that JPMorgan is manipulating the metals market. It’s not part of our business model. it would be wrong and we don’t do it.”

But… if she fabricated data, blocked regulatory investigations, and lied under oath could she possibly also have… lied to CNBC? No… that is unpossible.

So what happens next?

Well, JPM can hope that its guy at the SEC, Andrew Ceresney, who happens to be in charge of the porn-addicted agency’s “enforcement” division, has just enough clout to make that other regulator, the FERC forget all about its inquiry, and its factually-justified allegations.

Or, failing that, and should justice finally prevail in this banana republic for one of the TBTF banks, what may just happen is that Blythe may end up in prison. Minimum security, of course, and for a very brief period of time, with all of her (allegedly) ill-gotten and accumulated wealth waiting for her upon reentry into society. And that’s fine.

But what we hope for is that there is at least a brief period of time when Blythe’s finger is not be on the gold “sell” button. Not because we want to be deprived of the opportunity to buy physical gold and silver at far cheaper than fair value prices (which, by the way, are meaningless when expressed in dying fiat), but because we are simply curious how high gold may go should JPM’s commodity queen finally be put away temporarily… or permanently.

Even for a total banana republic, this does not seem like such a far-fetched request.

    



 
Grand Theft Market: High-Frequency Frontrunning CME Edition

One of the New Normal responses to allegations, first started here in 2009 and subsequently everywhere, that all HFT does is to frontrun traditional market players (among many other evils) now that its conventional and flawed defense that it “provides liquidity” lies dead and buried, is that “everyone does it” so you must acquit because how can you possibly prosecute a technology that accounts for over 60% of all market volume and where if you throw one person in jail you would throw everyone in jail. Today we learn that this indeed may be the case, and not only at the traditional locus of HFT frontrunning such as conventional exchanges for stocks such as the NYSE or even dark pools, but at the heart of the biggest futures exchange in the US, the CME where as the WSJ’s (Read more…) Patterson explains frontrunning by HFT algos is not only a way of life, but is perfectly accepted and even smiled upon.

Stop us when all of this sounds familiar.

High-speed traders are using a hidden facet of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s computer system to trade on the direction of the futures market before other investors get the same information.

 

Using powerful computers, high-speed traders are trying to profit from their ability to detect when their own orders for certain commodities are executed a fraction of a second before the rest of the market sees that data, traders say.

 

The advantage often is just one to 10 milliseconds, according to people familiar with the matter and trading records reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. But that is plenty of time for computer-driven traders, who say they can structure their orders so that the confirmations tip which direction prices for crude oil, corn and other commodities are moving. A millisecond is one-thousandth of a second.

 

The ability to exploit such small time gaps raises questions about transparency and fairness amid the computer-driven, rapid-fire trading that increasingly grips Wall Street and confounds regulators.

Well, for there to be questions about “transparency” and “fairness” one’s underlying assumption must be that they exist. Luckily, courtesy of 4+ years of constantly broken markets, in which regulators jawbone and talk about fixing everything any day now, but nothing ever changes, because why change -  a rising manipulated tide lifts all boats (some more so than others) until it all crashes of course – nobody harbors even the faintest illusion that the stock and futures market casino is any less rigged than the shadiest Las Vegas backdoor operation.

What is more troubling is that while HFT had historically been relegated to such non-reflexive asset classes as stocks, now that it has entered the hyper-levered derivative and futures arena, all bets are off. Recall: “The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, a unit of CME Group Inc., is the largest U.S. futures exchange, handling 12.5 million contracts a day on average in the first quarter, according to Sandler + O’Neill Partners L.P. High-frequency trading generated about 61% of all futures-market volume, up from 47% in 2008, according to Tabb Group.”

For those who are unfamiliar with how HFT frontruns everything here is a quick breakdown:

Fast-moving traders can get a head start in looking at key information because they connect directly to the exchange’s computers, giving them the data just before it reaches the so-called public tape accessible to everyone else. The exchange connections contain a host of data, of which the advance notice of trade confirmations is only a piece.

 

All firms that connect directly to CME’s trading computers are able to get information ahead of the market when their trades are executed, firm officials say. But many companies are unaware of the advantage or choose not to use it, traders say, either because they don’t have the technology to take advantage of such tiny edges or employ different investing strategies.

 

CME spokeswoman Anita Liskey said the exchange operator is aware of the order delays, which industry officials refer to as a “latency.”

Others call it bare-faced robbery, or better yet Grand Theft Markets. And nobody cares. Actually, that’s not true. Those w

While many speed advantages are well-known to market insiders, only a relatively small group of sophisticated firms appears to be aware of the CME’s trade-reporting delays. The CME has told regulators that investors routinely get trade information at the same time. A March 29, 2012, CME presentation to the CFTC stated that market data “is disseminated to all participants simultaneously.”

 

A Chicago trading firm says it recently detected delays between the time it received confirmations of trades and the time the CME published the information on multiple futures contracts covering thousands of trades. For two weeks in late December and early January, the firm detected an average delay of 2.4 milliseconds for silver futures, 4.1 milliseconds in soybean futures and 1.1 milliseconds for gold futures.

Sophisticated traders have been aware of CME’s order-latency issue for years and have incorporated the information into their trading strategies, according to an official with Jump Trading LLC, a big Chicago high-frequency company.

 

Officials with Virtu Financial LLC, a high-speed trading firm in New York, view a slight head start as good for the overall market, according to a person familiar with their thinking. The person said the data helps traders who buy and sell futures contracts throughout the day manage risk and post more quotes that benefit other buyers and sellers. The person said Virtu doesn’t use the information to amplify its profits by anticipating moves elsewhere in the market.

If you are not laughing hysterically here, you are not paying attention.

Proponents say eliminating the ability of parties in a trade to get information slightly in advance could lead to less-liquid markets because some firms would be inclined to trade less due to the greater risks.

 

Officials with Chicago-based DRW Trading Group see the data-feed lags at CME as a “fact of life,” not an unfair advantage, because any firm trading in milliseconds can take advantage of it if they build their systems properly, according to a person familiar with their views.

 

Firms can use their early looks at CME trading data in several ways. One strategy is to post buy and sell orders a few pennies from where the market is trading and wait until one of the orders is executed. If crude oil is selling for $90 on the CME, a firm might post an order to sell one contract for $90.03 and a buy order for $89.97.

 

If the sell order suddenly hits, the firm’s computers detect that oil prices have swung higher. Those computers can instantly buy more of the same contract before other traders are even aware of the first move.

Then of course there is cross exchange latency arbitrage, a topic we first discussed in, oh… 2009.

Firms can also capitalize on that early information by buying a related product on another exchange before other traders know of a market shift. For example, it takes about 200 microseconds for trades to get from CME’s Aurora, Ill., data center to the computers of IntercontinentalExchange Inc. ICE +1.12% about 33 miles away. A microsecond is one-millionth of a second.

 

Traders able to see market swings milliseconds before others gives them “an informational advantage,” says Pete Kyle, a finance professor at the University of Maryland who is a former member of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Technology Advisory Committee.

 

Mr. Kyle likened the activity to “a tax on other traders” because “you get all the gains from being the first guy” to trade.

 

The CFTC, which oversees futures exchanges such as the CME, has been ramping up oversight of high-speed trading but agency officials said the CME’S latency issue isn’t currently an area of focus.

Have a problem with this latest feature of openly broken markets? Tough. Get in line. Else, just submit your order but expect to be routinely ripped off to the tune of pennies on every trade. Now multiply this by millions of times evry hour, for four years. It adds up.

No wonder it’s called the wealth effect. Effect for you. Wealth for them.

    



 
MF Global Trustee Sues Jon Corzine For Firm’s Collapse

Just about a year and a half after the bankruptcy filing of MF Global, the first real lawsuit that directly names former MF Global (and Goldman) CEO Jon Corzine and his cronies, has hit the docket with MFG Holdings bankruptcy trustee Louis Freeh as plaintiff. The complaint: breach of fiduciary duty. Of course, when one is a bundler for the president, such trivial concepts as duty to anyone else, be it fiduciary or otherwise, naturally does not exist.

The premise of the suit:

(Read more…)

During the period when Defendants were running MF Global, they dramatically changed the Company’s business plan without addressing existing systemic weaknesses that ultimately caused the plan to fail. As part of the new business plan, and in violation of his fiduciary duties to MF Global as the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Holdings Ltd. and MF Global Inc. (“MFGI”), Defendant Corzine engaged in risky trading strategies that strained the Company’s liquidity and could not be properly monitored by the Company’s inadequate controls and procedures. Defendants Abelow and Steenkamp, Corzine’s hand-picked deputies and the Company’s most senior officers, breached their fiduciary duties by failing to ensure that the Company’s procedures and controls were adequate and could accommodate the Company’s new business plan.

The full details, and the nature of the verb to Corzine (as per Urban Dictionary: verb. to trust your money to a prominent individual and to find it has mysteriously disappeared “Oh no! Look at the financial statement. We have been corzined!”), well-known to all of our readers, are listed in the full suit attached below.

As for the rhetorical question of whether crony capitalist justice will prevail and if Corzine will finally be released from prison, oh wait, sorry, wrong parallel universe, the answer is a resounding no.