Posts Tagged ‘Yield Curve’
Goldman Slams Abenomics: “Positive Impact Is Gone, Only High Yields And Volatility Remain; BOJ Credibility At Stake”

While many impartial observers have been lamenting the death of Abenomics now that the Nikkei – essentially the only favorable indicator resulting from the coordinated and unprecedented action by the Japanese government and its less than independent central bank – has peaked and dropped 20% from the highs, Wall Street was largely mum on its Abenomics scorecard. This changed overnight following a scathing report by Goldman which slams Abenomics, it sorry current condition, and where it is headed, warning that unless the BOJ promptly implements a set of changes to how it manipulates markets as per Goldman’s recommendations, the situation will get out of control fast. To wit: “Our conclusion is that the positive market reaction initially created by the policy has been almost completely undone. At the same time, a lack of credible forward guidance for (Read more…) duration means that five-year JGB yields have risen in comparison with before the easing started, and volatility has also increased. It will not be an easy task to completely rebuild confidence in the BOJ among overseas investors after it has been undermined, and the BOJ will not be able to easily pull out of its 2% price target after committing to it.”

Bad, bad Kuroda.

Not surprisingly, the primary driver of skepticism – both Goldman’s, and that of its clients who recently got crushed based on Goldman’s long Nikkei trade recommendations – is the epic surge in JGB vol, which Zero Hedge first cautioned about when the BOJ unleashed its monetary bazooka and since then with periodic updates. And sure enough, Goldman which disappointed with its expectation that the BOJ would unveil a 2 year LTRO equivalent operation, is once again back to tutoring its failing student, Kuroda, about what he should do in order to put Abenomics back on the tracks, or else risk the complete loss of confidence in this latest (and possibly last reflationary chance) program from both the most important bank, as well as those whose money is critical in preserving the smooth glidepath of Abenomics – overseas investors (i.e., Goldman’s clients).

Will the BOJ implement Goldman’s ultimatum, and if not, will the great Japanese reflationary experiment crash and burn? Find out soon enough.

From Goldman’s Naohiko Baba

Impact from new BOJ easing disappears, eroded confidence is one significant factor 

 

One of the main focuses for overseas equity investors since late May has been the JGB market. They have invested in Japanese equities with one eye on the tail risk from Japan’s fiscal problems, which could explode at any time. They are therefore more nervous than most Japanese about the rise and instability in long-term JGB yields since unprecedented easing was introduced in April. We believe there is a particularly large gap in recognition between overseas investors and the BOJ on this issue.

 

BOJ Governor Kuroda’s comments at a press conference on May 22 after the monetary policy meeting were taken by the market as an acceptance  of rising JGB yields. Overseas investor confidence in the BOJ was further undermined after the June 11 policy meeting when the committee decided not to extend the duration of fixed interest rate operations, an action that was already reported in the press and priced in by the markets.

 

As a result, instability in long-term JGB yields has been having a significant knock-on impact on the equity and forex markets since late May. A look  at forex, equities, and the JGBi expected inflation rate shows that most of the initial positive impact from unprecedented easing was reversed in  mid-June, with only high yields and volatility remaining. The BOJ urgently needs to reestablish forward guidance for its policy duration and a communication strategy that does not involve contradictory messages.

 


Or else… Goldman continues:

Overseas investors focused on JGB market instability

The author has recently returned from meetings with more than 100 overseas investors in Europe and Asia in early-June and have also talked to investors who visited Tokyo from around the world. Discussions with them focused on Abenomics, and we were surprised that the JGB market was not only the main focus of investors who concentrate on rates and forex, but also for equity investors.

The specific themes that came up in our meetings with these investors included: (1) reasons why long-term JGB yields rose and have become unstable after the introduction of unprecedented easing aimed at doubling the monetary base over two years through large-volume JGB purchases (announced by the BOJ on April 4); (2) how to interpret BOJ’s stance toward the JGB yields and their stability based on conflicting statements made by Governor Haruhiko Kuroda on long-term yields; (3) whether or not the government, and the Finance Ministry in particular, plans to allow the JGB market to remain unstable; and (4) the possibility that huge JGB purchases by the BOJ may cause the government to lose incentives for fiscal restructuring, given calls to postpone consumption tax hikes among some officials close to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Of course, this strong interest in the JGB market among overseas investors is due to concerns over Japan’s fiscal conditions. Given government debt is currently at 240% GDP and still rising, they probably see Japan’s fiscal state as fragile, which could potentially give way under further pressure (see Exhibit 1). These overseas investors are very conscious of this huge tail risk when they invest in Japanese equities, and compared to  the Japanese, they have been much more uncomfortable with the increased yield volatility under the current unprecedented easing (see Exhibit 2). In the beginning, the easing helped the yen to depreciate and pushed up the Japanese equity market, and the BOJ may be thinking that volatility on the JGB market is a small price to pay for these positive market reactions.

Up to now, the driver of Abenomics has been overseas investors, but we see a significant gap between these investors and the BOJ in terms of the degree of concern over the instability of the JGB market. As a result, Kuroda’s remarks at a press conference post the May 22 monetary policy meeting were interpreted as an acceptance of further rises in long-term rates. Overseas investor confidence in the BOJ was further undermined at the June 11 monetary policy meeting when the BOJ decided to forego an extension to fixed rate operations after it was widely reported in the media and already factored into the market.

Of course, other negative factors were present, including disappointing market reaction to the “third arrow” growth strategy in Abenomics and an increase in global volatility on expectations that the Fed could wind back its quantitative easing measures soon. However, any positive market reaction to unprecedented easing has largely been undone, leaving only high JGB yields and high volatility, and we are not in any doubt that overseas investors have started to lose their confidence in the BOJ (see Exhibit 3).

Instability exacerbated by a lack of credible forward guidance for policy duration and conflicting statements from Kuroda

The 2-year commitment for the 2% price target is the backbone of Kuroda’s unprecedented monetary easing. Under the previous BOJ governor, Masaaki Shirakawa, the duration of JGBs bought under the Asset Purchase Program was limited to three years, which acted as a sort of forward guidance for policy duration and kept short-/medium-term rates low and stable. Kuroda’s designation of a two-year time frame for the 2% price target was meant to be another such forward guidance, by which the BOJ intends to lower the short- and medium-term zones in a stable manner. Meanwhile, massive JGB purchases are meant to suppress yields for longer-term zones.

The economic outlook report issued by the BOJ on April 26 stated that it saw a high probability of achieving 2% consumer price inflation in the next two years or so. We have already pointed out that we were not convinced by the BOJ’s argument for the economic impact of monetary easing, and we do not think the BOJ is able to earn market confidence about such a commitment. Under these conditions, the two-year time frame was unlikely to take root as credible forward guidance.

We are currently hearing two main prospective scenarios from market participants. In one, the BOJ undertakes massive JGB purchases, but inflation does not go up significantly, and the BOJ is obliged to unwind its current easing policy within two years due to concerns over the possible side effects. The second scenario involves the BOJ maintaining the easing on a semi-permanent basis until it achieves its 2% price target. Either case appears to suggest rising JGB yields in the future – due to supply-demand deterioration in the first scenario and concerns about debt monetization in the second. Furthermore, JGB market volatility tends to increase when visibility of the market outlook is quite low, as suggested by the current situation. We believe this has led to the comparatively large rise in 5-year JGB yields.

At the same time, inconsistencies in statements from Kuroda have caused confusion not only on the JGB market but also in the equity and forex markets. One specific example of this relates to his claim that the BOJ would aim to bring down the yield curve as a whole through large-volume JGB purchases. Kuroda made this claim when he introduced the unprecedented easing measures on April 4, and it was intended to be an important policy transmission channel. When long-term JGB yields started rising against his intentions, Kuroda said it wasn’t a problem as it was a result of inflation/growth expectations. Somewhat sardonically, the expected inflation rate (an indicator frequently referred to by both Kuroda and Deputy Governor Iwata; represented by CPI index-linked JGB movements) began to decline sharply after May 22, when Kuroda made the statement about rising bond yields (see Exhibit 3).

The BOJ also used the buzz word “portfolio rebalancing” to describe the effects its increased presence on the JGB market would have in encouraging institutional investors (banks, life insurance companies, etc.) to move away from the JGB market and into other markets, such as lending and foreign assets. Some institutional investors actually sold off JGBs as the BOJ expected, but market liquidity dried up with the resulting exit of these liquidity providers. This in turn increased market volatility, and some other market participants came under pressure to sell their JGB holdings in order to manage their risk, which fuelled a malignant cycle of further instability. The BOJ was left as one of the few buyers on the JGB market, and it is also being criticized for reducing market liquidity because of the lack of clarity around its large-lot JGB buying operations. Also, equity prices of some regional banks declined as a result of their substantial JGB yield risk exposure and the current instability of yields as well of concerns about future yield rises. We also need to be aware of the risk that they might attempt to sell even more JGBs than they need to if the JGB market continues to be volatile in the future.

JGB market instability spilled over to the equity and forex market, further exacerbating volatility

The rumblings in the JGB market have transferred to the equity and forex markets as well. We believe this reflects concerns among overseas investors about a lack of BOJ determination to stabilize the JGB market, as mentioned at the beginning of this report. The remarks made by BOJ Governor Kuroda at the press conference after the May 22 policy meeting were particularly interpreted as an acceptance of rises in JGB yields, and this has strengthened the link between volatility in long-term yields, equities, and the forex
market (see Exhibit 5).

In order to investigate this phenomenon more rigorously, we analyzed the reaction in volatility of equity prices and forex rates when long-term JGB yield volatility changes by 1% (see Exhibit 6). We can see a big change in trend from May 22, when Kuroda held his post policy meeting press conference. Equity and forex volatility began reacting strongly to changes in JGB yield volatility with a particularly noticeable reaction in equity volatility. Of course, we do not attribute all of the market volatility to the BOJ. Other factors have impacted the markets, including disappointing market reaction to the “third arrow” growth strategy of Abenomics and an increase in global volatility on expectations that the Fed could unwind its quantitative easing measures soon. Still, our conversations with overseas investors suggest to us that instability in the JGB market is a significant factor behind the diffusion of that instability to the equity and forex markets as the BOJ gave the impression that it sees JGB market volatility as acceptable or lacks measures to stabilize it.

* * *

In conclusion, here is Goldman’s ultimatum to Japan on what it should do now – and yes, life would be so much easier if Goldman had one of its alumni running the central bank in Japan, as it does in the US, Europe and now, England.

Urgent need to rebuild the forward guidance and communication strategy

Exhibit 7 summarizes the market reaction from the start of the unprecedented easing on April 4 all the way to the present. We extracted a common factor from three variables in the BOJ’s focus for policy transmission (equity prices, forex rates, and the JGB expected inflation rate) using principal component analysis. Our conclusion is that the positive market reaction initially created by the policy has been almost completely undone. At the same time, a lack of credible forward guidance for policy duration means that five-year JGB yields have risen in comparison with before the easing started, and volatility has also increased.

It will not be an easy task to completely rebuild confidence in the BOJ among overseas investors after it has been undermined, and the BOJ will not be able to easily pull out of its 2% price target after committing to it. We therefore see a need for the BOJ to offset this with an improvement in its communication strategy. We especially see a need for the BOJ to clearly outline its basic intentions and provide, in a consistent manner, a time frame for how long-term yields will be formed under the unprecedented easing. It also needs to establish specific measures to stabilize the JGB market in case of an emergency.  Unprecedented easing relies overwhelmingly on financial market transmission channels, and it is important for the central bank to urgently rebuild stability thereby enhancing thevisibility for the main players on these markets – overseas investors.

* * *

To summarize: Goldman is angry (that year end bonuses may not be at new all time highs, which after all was the whole point behind Abenomics). And you don’t want to see Goldman angry.

    



 
1994 Redux? But Not In Bonds

In UBS’ view, 1994 is critical for guiding investing today. The key point about 1994 was not that US bond yields rose during a global recovery. But that the leverage and positioning built up in previous years, on the assumption that yields would remain low, then got stressed. The central issue, they note, is that a long period of lacklustre growth, low rates and easy money induces individual investors, funds, non-financial corporates and banks to reach for yield. In many cases, they gear up to do it. (Read more…) And as Hyman Minsky warned; in this way, stability breeds leverage, and leverage breeds instability.

 

 

Via UBS: 1994 Redux?

Sebastian Mallaby has written an excellent account of the 1994 bond market blowout in ‘Hurricane Greenspan’, chapter eight of his book ‘More money than God’ (Bloomsbury press, 2010). In his depiction of the legendary hedge fund trader Michael Steinhardt – he describes how hedge funds, and a range of other financial institutions, chased convergence trades from 1990-1993.

They played term carry (borrowing short term to buy long dated bonds within the US). They ran cross regional carry trades (borrowing in Germany or the US to buy Italian & Spanish bonds as these countries prepared for EU membership).

And they rushed to buy assets that were priced off convergence trades; emerging market property, peripheral banks. They even bought defensive growth stocks (with the idea that the PE on a defensive growth stock should converge to the inverse of the 10 year yield).

We argue below that the set-up today is very similar to that in early 1994.

The danger in these trades is that a cyclical recovery, especially a global cyclical recovery, will cause yields to rise and compel policy makers to withraw accommodation. And that this can induce an outsized reaction in all the convergence trades ultimately priced off treasuries, as leverage is removed.

This is why the central lesson from 1994 is that, after a long period of easy money, when a cyclical recovery kicks in and policymakers are setting to remove accommodation, at all costs avoid convergence trades and avoid assets that are priced off convergence trades.

And the popular convergence trades of the past months have been;

  • Emerging market credit
  • Emerging market property
  • Southern European sovereign debt
  • Peripheral European sovereign debt
  • US mortgage backed securities
  • US and global high yield debt
  • Global defensive growth stocks.

So what brings us to think that we can use 1994 as a guide to investing for the rest of 2013?

In the section below we highlight several key developments from 1990-1995 and the comparison with the current situation;

1990-Feb 1994

The Fed ran a very easy monetary policy from 1990-early ’94 in an attempt to reflate the US economy in aftermath of the S&L crisis. We have seen lower rates & even easier monetary policy since 2009.

US growth remained lacklustre throughout 1990-1993, going through a series of moderate ‘mini-cycles’. We have seen even more lacklustre growth over the past four years.

US 10-year treasury yields fell from 9% to 5% from 1990-early 1994, as a recession and then disinflationary pressure pushed down inflation expectations. Treasury yields fell from 4.3% in 2007 to 1.4% in the summer of 2012.

US banks hoarded treasuries.

Lending remained lacklustre.

Corporates hoarded cash & paid back debt.

From 1990-1994 Capital flowed into emerging markets. Asia boomed. The former USSR saw large inflows also. Capital flowed heavily into emerging markets from 2009-11, although it then slowed in 2H11 & 2012 as the Fed ended QE2.

Credit spreads tightened from 90-94, and from 09-13.

Commodities remained in the doldrums from 1990-1994. This was unusual, given the strong capital flows into emerging markets. But the implosion of the military/industrial complex in Russia from 1989 saw domestic demand for commodities collapse. Russia then exported nickel, aluminium, palladium, platinum, copper and oil to get hold of hard currency. Commodity prices came under intense pressure. This contrast is with the 2009-13 period – where capital flows & restocking drove commodity prices higher from 2009-11, but where capital outflows, destocking and new supply drove prices lower in 2011/12.

Headline CPI trended down, persuading many that there was no cause for rate hikes. We have seen a similar trend from mid-2001.

The dollar trade weighted index range traded between 80 & 95 from 1990-1995. An interesting development was that the dollar weakened while the US economy recovered through 1994, and while the Fed raised rates 225bps. The DXY has been range trading in a similar manner, broadly between 75 and 90 since 2009.

The extended period of low rates and strong capital flows into emerging markets induced a huge build-up of leverage across financial & non-financial institutions on a global basis.

The strong flows of capital into emerging markets set off the procyclical growth dynamic we have described regularly.

Capital inflows induce central banks to print their own currency to buy the dollars coming in. Bank deposits rise, and banks lend to construction and engineering companies. Growth & inflation pick up. And with nominal rates sticky, real rates fall. That in turn incentivises procyclical gearing up to buy & build houses, inventory and general fixed capital formation.

The Asian tigers grew aggressively, and their stock markets boomed going into 1993. Emerging markets recovered in 2009/10, struggled into 2011/12 and then saw a patchy recovery until recently.

The problem with the reflationary process in emerging markets is that it sows the seeds for its own destruction. Because the low real rates in EM induce excessive gearing & fixed capital formation – compared to a more balanced allocation of capital, had real rates stayed steady above zero. This leaves misallocated capital, and the latent potential for bad loans to emerge when credit becomes scarce. It also causes a deterioration in the trade balance. Both make emerging markets increasingly dependent on capital flows to stay afloat.

In many cases, emerging market governments will react to rising inflation by attempting to restrict credit growth (rather than raising rates). The problem with this is that it incentivises US dollar borrowing.

Emerging market business finds it attractive to borrow in dollars when domestic inflation is rising, the domestic currency is appreciating, and domestic borrowing costs are higher than dollar funding. And it is even more attractive when the activity the loans are funding – from inventory building to FCF – sees price/cost rises.

But when the trends reverse – the domestic currency depreciates, the dollar funding becomes more dear, the inventory values fall – then emerging market corporates can find themselves squeezed. Very rapidly.

But it is not just EM. In the long history of financial crises, the ‘reach for yield’ during a slow growth and low yield environment has on multiple occasions set up the conditions for financial stress when yields eventually rose.

The book ‘More money than God’ by Sebastian Mallaby (Bloomsbury, 2010), gives an excellent description of the leverage and yield enhancing structures that built up in the 1990-1993 period, and the carnage inflicted upon that leverage in 1994. Some examples include:

  • Bank & hedge fund carry trades – borrowing at the short end to purchase long dated bonds.
  • Borrowing in USD and German marks to buy Italian and Greek long term debt
  • Borrowing to buy high yield corporate debt.
  • he use of interest rate swaps to generate yield enhancement.
  • Leverage purchases of buy-to-let properties

We have also seen a significant build up in leverage over the past four years. Buy-to-let investment has risen strongly in the US/UK/Switzerland/Scandinavia. Retail investors have become heavily exposed to credit through mutual funds and credit ETFs.

Investors became very overweight long duration defensive growth and dividend yielding equities, at the expense of cyclical exposure.

Investors have left themselves highly exposed to any kind of cyclical rally outside the US, as well as within it. Valuations (as we noted here) are extremely varied.

1994

As macro activity in the US accelerated, corporates stopped hoarding cash and started to seek to borrow to expand their businesses.

US banks, which had been hoarding treasuries, sold them to make way for increased corporate loans. Treasuries started to sell off.

The Fed then responded to the steepening curve and the improving macro conditions by raising rates by 25bps in February 1994. This came as a surprise to the market, which was not aware of the Fed’s internal deliberations. The transcript of the February meeting indicates that Fed members were wary of a 1988/89 style spike in inflation if they did not start the process of tightening.

Greenspan believed that the curve would flatten, as markets anticipated tighter policy moderated inflation expectations in the future.

But that’s not what happened.

The rise in rates instead dented the derivative trades predicated on no rise in yields, and it squeezed carry traders. That induced a more aggressive unwinding of treasury holdings, as leveraged carry trades unwound. And the Banks accelerated the sell off as they sold treasuries to make space for increased corporate lending. So the yield curve steepened over the year, with 10-year yields rising 306bps vs the 225bp rise in Fed funds.

An array of casualties ensued, from Orange county, California, that went bankrupt due to its exposure to a series of exotic interest rate swaps. To a number of prominent hedge funds – which saw extreme losses in February 1994.

Then there was the international fallout. The sharp increase in domestic demand for credit, combined with the increase in real rates induced powerful capital flows back to the US. This sucked liquidity out of several emerging markets, whose central banks had to retire domestic currency to repay the dollars exiting their countries. Soon, countries that had seen the most aggressive investment booms, which had done the most aggressive US dollar borrowing, and which suffered the largest current account deficits, came under intense duress. The Mexican peso crisis erupted, and the seeds were sown for a sustained deterioration in Asia, before the full collapse of the Asian crisis in 1997.

One of the conundrums of 1994 was the US dollar. It would be logical to think that, with a sharp rise in US growth, in rates & yields that the US dollar would have rallied. But it didn’t. It fell.

An important reason was that the US recovery, while stronger than expected, was not a big surprise. But what was a surprise was the European recovery – after the sustained post-unification funk in Germany, and the Scandinavian banking crisis in 1992. In our view in commodity strategy – it was the relative surprises – which made Europe’s recovery much more unexpected, that triggered the currency move.

This is particularly interesting today – with the broad consensus that the US dollar is going to rally, due to the more robust recovery in the US and the potential for tapering.

But it is always worth keeping an eye on relative macro surprises.

We see the potential for a counter trend fall in the US dollar.

Now there are clearly some stark differences between today and 1994. Back then interest rates were much higher. So 300bps on treasuries increased rates by three fifths. The same rise from the July low would treble rates. And certainly, the authorities are first talking about an extended period of QE tapering. We are still a distance away from actual rate hikes.

The Fed is also much more transparent than it was under Greenspan in the early 1990s.

Where conditions are similar is that a very large structure of leverage has built up on the back of low rates, from leveraged property & credit buying, large retail exposure to yield enhancement products (high yield ETFs etc), earlier dollar leverage driven investment booms in emerging markets.

So where are we now. It looks to us very similar to February 1994.

The Fed’s continued insistence on talking tapering despite the recent rollover in US macro surprises has started to unsettle leveraged yield enhanced positioning.

The US high yield ETF has come under severe pressure. The US mortgage spread has blown out relative to the US 30-year treasury yield. South African and Indian currencies are under pressure. India has responded by raising taxes on gold imports.

In 1994, Mexico was the first to feel the brunt. Followed by South Korea in 1997. In 2013, South Africa is feeling the pressure. Although other emerging markets, notably China, continue to benefit.

The next big question is; can the US withstand a higher cost of capital, like it did from 1994-98.

In short, no!

In the mid-late ‘90s, the US coped with a higher cost of capital in several ways. It enhanced productivity through a rapid adoption of tech. Corporates geared up, which ensured strong liquidity growth and ‘efficient’ balance sheets. Corporates went through a second round of ‘just in time’ inventory management and outsourcing. Consumers benefited from the strong dollar and falling commodity prices – seeing their disposable incomes improve. And the disinflation in EM translated to a downtrend in yields from 1994, which allowed for an acceleration in the housing market and an expansion of household debt.

But we have a number of concerns that hint at vulnerability.

The first is that the potential for sustained disinflation over multiple years is less, because yields are already low. Consequently, there is less scope for a sustained recovery in housing – beyond the initial flurry of demand from rising household formation. The sharp rise in mortgage spreads is one hint that this transition may be more difficult. The spread on mortgages may be particularly important for the leveraged buy-to-let investors, who have been heavily involved in the recent surge in housing sales.

Because we understand that a large part of the buying is from investors then seeking to rent out the properties, we suspect that the follow-through consumer demand may not be as aggressive as previously imagined. If a household buys a house, taking on debt, it opens the floodgates to increasing debt fuelled buying of cars, household furnishings and white goods. A very different psychology comes from paying a month up-front on a rental. You are much more likely to cut back, to be more frugal.

Government debt levels are clearly extended, and the deficit needs to be cut to prevent further deterioration

A more subtle point is that the extended expansion of government spending as a share of GDP in response to the financial crisis is crowding out the private sector, and reducing the productive potential of the US economy. This stands in stark contrast with the tight control of government debt in the early 1990s under the Clinton administration.

These suggest that it is much less likely that we see the US enter a ‘high plateau’ of growth as we saw from 1995-98, where the US saw a powerful productivity & credit fuelled boom while the emerging markets deflated. And it makes it more likely that the US stays on a lower trajectory, interspersed with periodic recessionary slowdowns in the years ahead.

The point at which the market realises this would likely herald a significant risk-off event.

    



 
Why The BoJ’s Policy Is Inherently Destabilizing

One glance at the chart below and it is very clear that there is a glaring difference between the market’s reaction to the Fed’s QE and the BoJ’s QQE. Aside from the magnitude and velocity of the equity market response that is, the Fed has been inherently volatility-suppressing (with VIX near all-time lows as stocks rise) while (aside from the last week or so), as the Nikkei surged, Japanese implied volatility also surged. As UBS’ Larry Hatheway notes, fundamentally, Japan’s policy settings and preferences (moving from deflation to inflation, which is the stated objective of ‘Abenomics’) embed a great deal of implied volatility, only some of which has already manifested itself in asset prices. The proverbial cat has been thrown among the pigeons – scatter they must – the Fed’s QE has dampened volatility while the BoJ’s QE (Read more…) boosted volatility.

 

 

Via UBS’ Larry Hatheway,

Japan will face vast challenges that will be the direct consequence of ending deflation. The biggest will be the re-allocation of fixed income portfolios away from assets which have been priced for ‘perpetual’ deflation, including Japanese government bonds (JGBs) and other yen-denominated deposits and debt instruments (e.g., corporate bonds). Moreover, that asset re-allocation could well be discontinuous (i.e., abrupt). That is because current yields in Japan are too low for a world where inflation moves from minus 50-100 basis points to plus 200 basis points.

More subtly – yet more powerfully – the move is unlikely to be smooth because of the shift between two remote equilibriums. The first, which is where Japan has resided for more than a decade, is a world of deflation, where real yields are positive even when nominal interest rates are at or near the zero bound, as is the case for the entire JGB yield curve today. Investors will willingly hold low-yielding bonds in that environment, provided they are confident deflation will persist. The second equilibrium is found at much higher nominal yields—high enough to maintain positive real returns as positive rates of inflation are restored.

But Japan can only be in deflation or inflation – ‘no-flation’ is a transitory stage between them. Hence, if inflation expectations shift, asset prices are likely to move rapidly and significantly, most probably in de-stabilizing fashion. The move is likely to be large for another reason. As we noted in our earlier research, Japanese financial and household sectors are heavily exposed to their own bond market. For example, according to the IMF, roughly a quarter of Japanese bank assets are comprised of Japanese government debt. Worryingly, in the initial stages of any sell-off, it is difficult to imagine any group of private-sector investors that would be willing to step in to smooth the asset re-allocation. Most probably only the Bank of Japan could stand on the other side of any large-scale Japanese asset allocation shift out of bonds.

Yet for at least two reasons the BoJ would probably be a reluctant buyer. First, the scope of selling could be massive. After all, the gross stock of Japanese government debt outstanding that is not already or prospectively held by the Bank of Japan is nearly 200% of GDP, while total Japanese corporate debt (financial and non-financial notes and bonds) amounts to another 60% of GDP. Even if investors only shed a tenth of their aggregate debt holdings, the sum to be absorbed by the BoJ would roughly double again the size of its already swollen balance sheet.

But that’s not all. In acquiring those assets, the Bank of Japan would be creating another surge in high-powered money, but now in an environment of stronger growth, positive inflation and a probable rise in bank lending. Surely, at that point, even more large-scale monetary easing would be contrary to the Bank of Japan’s policy aims. After all, the BoJ has pledged to achieve 2% inflation—not a significant overshoot.

Of course, the BoJ could prevent leakage of more high-powered money into the economy by raising reserve requirements or hiking interest rates, but that would also create considerable risk of policy error—either doing too much or too little. An alternative would be to prevent the asset re-allocation in the first place. For some classes of existing bondholders—for instance, banks, insurance companies and pension funds—that could be accomplished by introducing regulations requiring them to hold government debt as ‘liquidity buffers’, ‘eligible collateral’ or for ‘macro-prudential reasons’. In other words, it could be possible to engage in financial repression to smooth the Japanese bond market adjustment in the move from deflation to inflation.

Of course, if Japanese policymakers throttle the asset allocation shift via financial repression, banks, insurance companies and pension funds would find themselves holding assets with very low yields, potentially below their cost of funds. Their share prices could plummet as a result.

In sum, the price of success—where success is defined as ending deflation in Japan—is likely to be significant volatility in Japanese asset markets. But the spillovers might not end there. Given their historic (and demographic) preference for income, Japanese investors shedding yen-denominated bonds might be inclined to re-allocate a significant fraction of their wealth to foreign notes and bonds, inducing a large capital outflow which could send the yen sharply lower in foreign exchange markets.

The bottom line is that Japan’s policy settings and preferences embed a great deal of implied volatility, only some of which has already manifested itself in asset prices. The proverbial cat has been thrown among the pigeons—scatter they must.

As is clear – the impact of these actions across varying asset classes is widely varied:

 

The data lead to a few stylized facts:

  • A USA-Japan split: The first point is that measures of volatility in the US and Japanese markets have diverged markedly. While volatility behaviour was correlated during the post-Lehman crisis and during the European crisis, divergence is now plainly evident. It illustrates the point made above: The Fed’s QE has dampened volatility while the BoJ’s QE has boosted volatility.
  • Not all markets are equal: The main movements are in fixed income markets. We note that the JGB futures market has been closed at various times due to excessive intra-day volatility. And swaption volatility is much higher than in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis. Meanwhile, currency implied volatility remains moderate compared to previous highs, as is the case for long-term equity volatility.
  • Short-term volatility has reacted more than long-term volatility: Although a typical feature of the volatility curve, long-dated volatility has remained subdued, particularly for equities. That outcome is at odds with our view that the market volatility will remain elevated for an extended period for time.